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Sarty: Defenders and the Defended in Halifax, 1915

Roger Sarty

A

ccording to M u r p h y ' s law, if
something can go wrong it will go
wrong. This is especially true of military
operations, which involve complicated
equipment, large numbers of people,
and rapidly changing situations. As
Halifax has been a fortress town for two
and a half c e n t u r i e s it is almost
inevitable that at some time or another
the garrison would damage the city through wellintentioned efforts to protect the place. In light
of the fact that coastal defence guns operated
within a couple of thousands yards of the city
until 1960, it is perhaps surprising that there
were so few accidents. The most serious mishap
occurred during the First World War.

At the end of July and the beginning of
August 1914 the Halifax defences mobilized
according to well-laid plans. The garrison
included about 3,000 troops, of whom a third
were professional soldiers of the permanent
force, and the rest militiamen from around the
Maritimes. They built trenches at positions on
the outer harbour where German saboteurs or
raiding parties might land, and manned six
modern coast artillery forts that the British army
had built before turning the fortress over to the
Canadian government in 1905-6.'
Halifax was of great strategic importance.
The British war effort depended upon the supply
of raw materials and equipment from North
America across the Atlantic, and this vital
seaborne trade was a logical target for Germany's
powerful navy. Halifax served as a secure haven
for merchant ships and also as a protected base
from which the Royal Navy's warships could
track down German commerce raiding cruisers.

There was a real possibility, British
naval leaders believed, that the fast
German cruisers might attempt a raid
on the port. 2 The garrison had to be
alert, but on 1 March 1915 an excess of
zeal nearly brought tragedy to two
Halifax families.
At mid-morning on that day, Miss
Alice O'Brien, 25, left her father's house on
Lucknow Street in the city's fashionable south
end for a ride on her horse, which was at a stable
a few blocks away. The O'Briens lived in one half,
No. 10, of a double house which had been built
around 1890. The wooden building was typically
late Victorian, with two narrow, high-ceilinged
stories whose front wall was almost flush with
the sidewalk. Alice's father, the federal
government's inspector of weights and measures,
was at his downtown office when she left for her
ride. Mrs. O'Brien had also gone downtown, to
shop, and only the maid remained at home.
Number 12 Lucknow, separated from number
10 by a partition wall, belonged to L. Clyde
Davidson, a publisher and stationer. In the
Davidson house as well, the maid alone was
present. 3
Shortly after Alice began her ride, a little
steamer, the federal Department of Marine and
Fisheries vessel Brant, chugged out from the
inner harbour. It stopped off the central part of
McNab's Island to place a marker buoy over a
shoal. 4 Brant was still inside the "examination
line" where every ship wishing to enter harbour
had to identify itself to the navy's "examination
vessel." Supporting the examination vessel were
the powerful guns of Fort McNab, atop a 100foot hill at the southern end of McNab's Island.
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Brant, on its return trip, had passed
Ives Point Battery, which, from its
position on the north-western tip of
McNab's Island, stood guard over the
entrance to the inner harbour. The
officer in c h a r g e w a s u n d e r
instructions to let no ship pass the
fort into the port unless it had been
cleared by the examination service.
Brant had not been cleared and
ignored signals from the fort, so the
gunners did what they had trained to
do. One of the fort's 12-pounder guns
placed a shell behind the steamer.
There was no reaction. A second shot
kicked up the water scarcely 25 feet
ahead of the bow when, as we have
seen, Brant stopped. 6

If a ship violated the regulations, a six-inch gun,
designated the "examination gun," would fire a
round across the offender's bow. In the event a
few "bring-to" rounds failed to inspire cooperation, the garrison had instructions to fire
for effect and destroy the vessel. The examination
system thus worked as a trip-wire to bring the
defences down on a disguised enemy raider
before it could slip into the port to drop mines
and shoot up moored vessels and the dockyard.5
At 1145 hours Brant turned around and
headed back towards the inner harbour. In the
words of the steamer's master:
.. .left for Indian Point buoy, running slow speed;
dinner bell rung and I left pilot house for dinner.
As I was taking my dinner I heard what I thought
was the 12 o'clock gun; took no notice. As I was
returning to pilot house I heard a second shot. I
stopped ship, as we were at Indian Point buoy,
and to give men time to get their dinner. As we
were engaged in lifting buoy, officer came
alongside and informed me to proceed to Patrol
Ship [the examination vessel], which I did. The
Officer came aboard and saw the work we were
engaged in.

By this time, shortly after noon,
Alice O'Brien had finished riding and
started home. A block or so from
Lucknow Street she met a friend who
blurted out that something dreadful
had happened. Hurrying on, Alice was
horrified to see a crowd around her
house: many of the upper storey
windows were shattered, and bits of
plaster and splintered wood were
scattered about.
Just before Alice's return, people in the area
had heard a whistling sound, and then an
explosion on the roof of the O'Brien house.
Images of a German cruiser or of a Zeppelin
pouring high explosives into the city flashed
through the minds of some witnesses. With less
fertile imaginations, the O'Brien and Davidson
maids, who, fortunately, had been hanging
laundry in the backyard, assumed something
had gone wrong with the heating system. 7
The furnace had not exploded and the
Germans had not arrived. On the staircase inside
the O'Brien house, beneath holes in the roof,
lay a lump of steel engraved with damning
evidence: a broad arrow and the digits 11-97
showed it to be p a r t of an artillery shell
manufactured for the British government in
November 1897. One of the shells from Ives Point
Battery had apparently bounced off the water
and whizzed over the south end of the city to hit
the centre of the roof of numbers 10-12 Lucknow
Street, some 3,700 yards from the fort. On
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striking the building a contact fuze detonated
the charge in the shell.
Designed to tear open the hulls of torpedo
boats and destroyers, the exploding round blew
a hole two feet by four feet in the roof over the
O'Brien's staircase and spread fragments which
ripped a half-dozen holes, one 18 inches in
diameter, in the roof of the Davidson house.
Other steel splinters blasted through the
partition, flew across the adjacent stairwell in
the Davidson house, penetrated a second wall
and entered one of the bedrooms, smashing
some of the furniture. One fragment was found
buried six inches in the far exterior wall of the
Davidson house. 8
Good luck alone had prevented deaths or
severe injuries. The coast gunners knew that
shells could ricochet like this, and yet had run
the risk to stop, of all things, a government
steamer. What had gone awry?
Militia and navy headquarters in Ottawa
concluded that the accident was the result of a
failure of inter-service co-operation. The navy
regarded the examination service line under Fort
McNab as the official entrance to the port. The
militia, however, treated the Ives Point-Point
Pleasant line, some two miles further inside the

harbour, as the boundary. Consequently, the
navy had informed the master of Brant that he
need not report to the examination vessel unless
he passed outside the vessel, while the militia
officer commanding at Ives Point Battery was
under instructions to challenge any vessel
attempting to enter past his fort without
clearance.9
The militia adopted the navy's boundary, as
it should have already done. The navy had
precedence in all matters concerning the
regulation of ship movements. There had been
a second lapse in the defence arrangements,
however. The best way to let the crusty captains
of local craft go about their business without
locking antlers with the battery commanders was
to have the harbour craft fly special recognition
signals. The Halifax Defence Scheme, the
lengthy secret document on the basis of which
the fortress had mobilized for war, had provided
for precisely this, but in the confusion of August
1914 it had not been done.
There was no difficulty in ensuring that the
two services applied the same regulations in the
same way, but nevertheless the accident was a
chilling reminder that every warning shot fired
by the fortress guns might endanger the lives
and property of the population around the

The house at No. 10/12 Lucknow Street that was hit by an errant "bring-to" shot
fired from a 12-pounder gun at the the Ives Point Battery on McNab Island.
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The 12-pounder Q.F. [Quick Fire] gun position,
Hugonins Battery, McNab Island, Halifax, NS,
September 1914.

examination service at Halifax even in the spring
of 1916 when the low level of the German threat
allowed some reduction in the readiness of the
city's defences.14

harbour. This was a dilemma. Pending a
judgement from higher authorities the coastal
gunners took the politic course by deciding that
no gun should be fired towards the inner
harbour, with its heavily built-up shores, unless
a ship was "obviously hostile."10
At the centre of the difficulty was the sixinch examination gun in Fort McNab. In this role
the weapon was more likely to fire in the
direction of the city and outlying settlements than
any other in the fortress. It had, in fact, already
displayed an awesome ricochet. One round fired
at a target 1,500 yards out in the main channel
had finally ploughed up a farmer's field far
beyond the opposite shore, over six miles from
the battery, and distressingly close to a church.
The hundred-pound projectile of the six-inch
gun, moreover, was eight times heavier than the
shell that hit the house on Lucknow Street. ] '
On studying the situation, the militia and
navy agreed that if the examination service was
to be effective in preventing a potentially
catastrophic attack on the city by a disguised
enemy raider, then the examination gun had to
be free to fire without restriction. "[D]amage to
property on shore must be accepted as a possible
consequence" of fully ready defences. Militia
headquarters in Ottawa therefore ordered that
the examination gun should fire warning rounds
at every ship that defied the examination service,
even if the gun had to fire towards the city.12 At
this very time, the Canadian government received
intelligence that Germany might be preparing a
naval raid on the Canadian coast.13 Although this
alarm, like many other similar ones during the
early months of the war, came to nothing, it did
confirm the wisdom of not relaxing defence
measures at key ports like Halifax. Certainly the
British Admiralty was adamant on the point,
insisting on the m a i n t e n a n c e of the full
58
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Happily for the townspeople, the militia did
not forget civilian safety. Realizing that the sixinch g u n was far too powerful for the
examination role, the militia mounted a small
six-pounder gun at Fort McNab expressly to fire
warning rounds. The light six-pound projectile
was sufficient to throw up a menacing geyser of
water, but did not have the mass and power to
ricochet anything like hundred-pound or even
t w e l v e - p o u n d s h e l l s , a n d would do
correspondingly less damage in the event of a
mishap. 15
These d e c i s i o n s set a p r e c e d e n t for
procedures at all of Canada's defended harbours
in both world wars. At each port the lightest gun
available was assigned to the examination
service, and fired warning rounds without
restriction when ships violated port-entry
procedures. In these ways the Lucknow Street
accident directly influenced Canadian coastal
defence policy.16
In Halifax, the Liberal Morning Chronicle
ominously noted that this was not the first time
shells had bounced from the harbour, but the
Conservative Herald assured its readers "that a
similar mishap will never occur again."17 City
Council did not discuss the accident. The only
mention of the military in the council minutes
for the spring of 1915 is a motion to urge the
federal government to despatch more troops for
overseas service through Halifax.1S The increased
shipping traffic resulting from the war, after all,
meant prosperity for the city.
The Department of Militia and Defence
arranged for repairs to the Davidson and O'Brien
houses. It was not, however, easy to cover the
building's wounds. In 1976 Miss O'Brien showed
the author cracks ten feet long in the plaster
above the staircase at number 10 Lucknow. But
the O'Briens at least enjoyed the element of the
ridiculous in the incident. A relative in England
wrote to them about the bombing raids on
British cities by German Zeppelins, and the
O'Briens replied that "we are being shelled too,
but by our own people!"
4
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Author's Note

I

originally learned of this incident from my
great uncle, E.A. Thompson, who had spent
the whole of his life in Halifax. During my first
forays, as a graduate student, into the military
records at the National Archives in Ottawa, I was
delighted to find documentation in both the
militia and naval files on the city's defences.
During the summer of 1976 I pursued the story
during a summer research trip to Halifax, and
discovered that Miss O'Brien still lived at the
house on Lucknow Street. She was then a very
spry 86, and had vivid recollections of the events
of 1 March 1915.
The article is a slightly cleaned up version
of the original drafts that I produced in the late
1970s. There are two points I would add on the
basis of s u b s e q u e n t work. The failure of
communication between the navy and the militia,
and the obvious s h a k i n e s s of the navy's
arrangements, is not surprising considering the
newness, troubled beginnings, and meagre
resources of the navy. It had been founded only
in 1910, and soon thereafter, because of political
controversy, virtually a b a n d o n e d by the
government. The naval aspects of the Halifax
defence scheme had previously been poorly
handled by the Department of Marine and
Fisheries, and in 1910-14 the navy did much to
improve the arrangements, but had almost
nothing, aside from resources borrowed from
other government departments, to work with.19
More generally, the incident to some limited
extent foreshadowed the catastrophic Halifax
explosion of December 1917. The navy was
legally responsible for shipping traffic control
within the port in wartime, but did not have the
resources or support of other government
authorities to make that control fully effective.
This was obviously the source of the 1915
incident. It was less obviously the case
concerning the collision between merchant
vessels that caused the disaster in 1917, but the
navy's shortcomings were the target of public
outrage, and figured prominently in the official
inquiries into the disaster.
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